When William Jennings Bryan was sworn in as Secretary of State in 1913, the newborn Wilson administration would have, as one biographer put it, “a pacifist committed, with remarkably few reservations, to nonviolence in dealings between nations.” Bryan, who was not a complete ideological ally with newly elected President Wilson, was placed in the administration largely due to the pull he still had with the Democratic party and populous, and as a return favor for Bryan’s help during the campaign. Bryan had been progressive populist hero for over twenty years by the time of Wilson’s election, having run for president three times on the Democratic ticket.
In the early days of Bryan’s secretaryship his philosophy was on full display. He was the anti-Teddy Roosevelt: speak, not softly but often, and carry no stick whatsoever. And yet, despite America’s experimenting with a non-military interventionist foreign policy leader, the rest of the world headed towards a military conflict unlike any it had ever seen before. It is true that the majority of the First World War ensued without American boots on the ground, but the boots eventually arrived, occurring after Bryan had resigned. His resignation came after he’d seen the writing was on the wall. His influence carried no weight.
This was certainly not first or the last time a major leader’s seeming philosophical convictions failed to formalize into reality. Wilson himself was re-elected for a second term after running on the theme “He kept us out of war,” only to have the US enter the war after his re-election. In keeping with the foreign policy theme, in more recent years this same sort of phenomenon can be seen. George W. Bush ran on a less interventionist foreign policy, then got us into Afghanistan and Iraq. Obama ran an even more peace-centric campaign, then, after his election, escalated the already on-going wars as well as started new proxy ones himself.
Trump also ran on a non-interventionist, America-First platform. His case is most interesting. He didn’t bring the troops home as promised, but he did battle the paradox to a stagnation. How? Two reasons, I believe. One, his will appears to be more ironclad than the men mentioned above. Whether stubbornness or obstinance, it’s clear that his has a less malleable makeup. The second reason the paradox didn’t exert itself fully under Trump was due to an ongoing battle with the press. The First World War and the wars in the Middle East were all propped up by the press, and the characters above are either agents of or compromised by the press. Trump didn’t always win his battles (if so, he’d still be President), but at least the battles occurred.
Therefore, willpower and the willingness to engage in conflict with those responsible for manufacturing consent have presented themselves as elements of a blueprint for combating contradictions between promises and policy. Bryan, a man of conviction, was so ingrained within his philosophy that it spilled into an unwillingness to exert power in any form. Bush is spineless, easily manipulated by those around him. Obama an empty suit, also easily manipulated, as well as a salesman in the business of selling no substance. This isn’t to say that Trump is the ultimate strongman who broke through a century-long paradox. He too is easily influenced. He battled to stagnation, not completion. But the blueprint is there: the will of one man—a great man of history—is required to take down not just this policy paradox but a multitude of paradoxes.
Trump is likely going to try again. Again, I don’t believe he’s necessarily the man, not being convinced that he’s a man who learns from his mistakes. But I’m also not against a second attempt. One, because examples are needed; the blueprint could use some more experimenting with. Two, because the people he allowed to influence him the most as it pertains to his foreign policy failures are also those who most deeply betrayed him. So even if the ability to learn from mistakes isn’t as strong as we’d like it, the refusal to forget betrayals is and will be ever present.